

IRREGULAR WARFARE

COUNTERINSURGENCY CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES

OCTOBER 10, 2006 - WASHINGTON CONVENTION CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FINAL REPORT

In partnership with
U.S. Army / Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Center

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The most likely threats the United States will face in the near future will come primarily from within weak or poorly-governed states – breeding grounds for sectarian violence, radical religious or ideological movements, genocide, and criminal and terrorist organizations with regional and global reach. During the Cold War our military was primarily configured to deter and defeat state-based, conventional military threats, which it did with great success. The overwhelming conventional capability of the U.S. military has led enemies to attempt to defeat us through other ways and means. Indeed, the only outright defeats suffered by western, technologically-based military forces to non-western enemies since the end of World War II have come at the hands of insurgent movements.

Furthermore, the world order ushered in by the Treaty of Westphalia is being challenged by a new form of insurgency – transnational, distributed, networked and ideologically driven. Continuing resistance to democratically elected regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with periodic sensational terrorist attacks in the United States and western Europe, are currently the primary manifestations of this insurgency. Successful counterinsurgency operations create the political conditions for local governments to gain legitimacy, provide security, generate economic growth, and create stability both within their borders and, often, across their regions – which eliminate the conditions in which insurgent movements flourish. Defeating insurgencies, therefore, requires the use of all elements of national power. In the military realm, effective counterinsurgency operations require conventional forces to adjust their mindset, organization and doctrine, and to create new capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures to secure populations and deal with guerrilla and terrorist threats.

Scholars and military thinkers have resurrected counterinsurgency theory and doctrine as a useful tool for dealing with this clear and growing threat to national security. The Quadrennial Defense Review also yielded concrete plans of action for transformation of the armed services to make them more agile in dealing with irregular threats, but much work remains to be done in this regard.

This panel will discuss the counterinsurgency challenges that the 21st century international security environment presents to the United States and its allies. The panel discussion will focus on the following aspects of counterinsurgency:

- Creation of a comprehensive, historically-based counterinsurgency doctrine that includes best practices from current operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.
- Changes to education and training regimes intended to create adaptive leaders and competent units with the capabilities required to wage effective counterinsurgency operations.
- Lessons learned from ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan that inform how the United States and its allies can improve their capabilities to conduct counterinsurgency operations, now and in the future.
- International perspectives on recent counterinsurgency operations.

MODERATOR:

Colonel Peter R. Mansoor

USA/USMC Counterinsurgency Center

PANELISTS:

Prof. Kalev I. Sepp

Naval Postgraduate School

Topic: *Best (and Worst) Practices in Counterinsurgency*

Conrad Crane, Ph.D.

U.S. Army Military History Institute

Topic: *Evolution of Counterinsurgency Doctrine*

Major General Jonathan Riley

British Army

Topic: *International Perspectives on Counterinsurgency*

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hickey

War College Fellow, School of Advanced Military Studies

Topic: *The Lessons of Tal Afar*

Best (and Worst) Practices in Counterinsurgency

Suppressing an insurgency requires an interagency approach that integrates activities in the economic, political and security sectors.

Over the past century, there have been 53 cases that can be classified as *insurgencies*, i.e. violent movements whose aim is overthrowing or seceding from an established government and whose methods include resistance to occupation and/or terrorism. The actions taken to defeat these insurgencies have been as diverse as their sources and characteristics. Countering some insurgencies has required more military support than others. Nevertheless, these cases have yielded a menu of “best practices.”

BEST PRACTICES TO DEFEAT AN INSURGENCY:

- Emphasis on intelligence, especially human intelligence. The primary source of this intelligence is the population itself.
- Separation of the insurgency from the population by employing military checkpoints and other means. This is tied to the idea of secure areas, which can then be maintained by persistent presence to ensure civic order.
- Utilization of military and civilian psychological operations campaigns to influence the attitudes and perceptions of individuals, organizations, or governments. This is particularly relevant given that the United States is restrained by laws established before the age of the Internet and satellite television.
- Expansion and diversification of local police forces.
- Reorientation of military forces as well as civilian institutions by decentralizing and devolving authority to the unit level.
- Embedding of military and civilian advisors in all local institutions.
- Denial of sanctuaries to insurgents by combining good governance and effective intelligence gathering.

- Provision of opportunities for amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents.
- Keeping the security and other basic needs of the population foremost in mind.
- Assisting the government to show clear signs of progress for ordinary citizens in designated insurgent zones.
- Placing one person in charge of integrating the overall strategy.

MALPRACTICES TO AVOID:

- Making the killing and capturing of insurgents the highest priority.
- Utilizing battalion-size (or larger) sweep operations.
- Concentrating military units on bases in order to ensure force protection.
- Employing Special Forces to conduct raids.
- Giving adviser duty low priority.
- Inadequate attention to open, porous borders.
- Continuing peacetime government processes (e.g., the system of managing contracts).
- Giving primacy to the military effort.

The objective of counterinsurgency is not victory, but a better peace. To achieve this objective, all agencies of the U.S. government must be engaged.

Evolution of Counterinsurgency Doctrine

The first time that the U.S. government wrestled with the problem of how to tackle an insurgency was in 1863 during the Civil War. At that time, Francis Lieber developed General Orders Number 100, which discussed how to deal with partisans, guerrillas, etc. The General Orders laid the foundation for martial law in 1900 in the Philippines.

The U.S. Army's interest in developing and revising counterinsurgency doctrine has been brief and episodic. The U.S. Marines' operations in the 1920s and 1930s in Haiti and Nicaragua led to the crafting of the *Small Wars Manual* in 1940. Thereafter, no official doctrine or publications on counterinsurgency emerged until the Vietnam experience.

Helmut Von Moltke, who commanded the armies of Prussia and unified Germany in the late 19th century, left a powerful legacy. By emphasizing that the purpose of the military is to fight and win major wars, he effectively divided war fighting and peace building into two separate spheres – the military and the diplomatic. For many years, these ideas pervaded U.S. thinking.

The Vietnam experience reinforced the tendency of the U.S. military to look primarily to develop new tactics and operational art. In the immediate post-Vietnam period, U.S. military doctrine turned to the question of defeating the Soviet Union. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War led to doctrinal innovations in the form of Active Defense and AirLand Battle.

In the 1980s, there was renewed interest in the idea of counterinsurgency. El Salvador was used as a model. According to this model, minimal United States involvement is required: the United States commits advisers and money, but the host nation essentially takes care of its own problems. This was the prevailing doctrine when the U.S. forces entered Iraq in 2003.

There have been several catalysts for changing how we think about and design effective counterinsurgency strategies. The impetus for change has, to a large extent, come from the bottom up. The missions in Somalia, Kosovo and Haiti educated junior leaders. More recently, key senior officers holding command positions in Iraq, such as Army LTG David Petraeus and LtGen James Mattis of the Marine Corps, have spurred change. Similar efforts have been underway in other agencies, led by the U.S. Department of State.

Changing the way an organization thinks requires new scenarios at training centers, new curriculum in military schools, better and accelerated lessons-learned processes, and different kinds of unit preparation before deployments.

Before 2005 counterinsurgency had been regarded as a subset of stability operations or of foreign internal defense. However, counterinsurgency has become a major campaign operational theme. This is reflected in the Army's FM3.0 *Operations* and the joint Army/Marine Corps manual *Counterinsurgency*.

THE NEW FM3-24 COUNTERINSURGENCY:

- Depicts counterinsurgency as a “mosaic war” which encompasses stability, offense and defense, and which varies by time, geography and echelon.
- Emphasizes unity of effort without necessarily unity of command.
- Underscores the importance of new kinds of intelligence (i.e., based on socio-cultural knowledge and awareness).
- Urges design before execution of operations, with special attention to how actions are likely to be perceived by the population.

COUNTERINSURGENCY [COIN] PRINCIPLES:

- Legitimacy is the main objective (as defined at the local level).
- Unity of effort is required.
- Acknowledge the primacy of politics.
- Understand the environment.
- Recognize that intelligence is the driver of operations.
- Isolate insurgents from their cause and support.
- Provide security under the rule of law.
- Be prepared for a long-term commitment.

COIN IMPERATIVES:

- Manage information.
- Use measured force.
- Learn and adapt.
- Empower the lowest levels.
- Support the host nation.
- Temper expectations.

COIN PARADOXES:

- The more you protect your force, the less secure you are.
- The more force you use, the less effective you are.
- The more successful you are, the less force you can use and thus the more risk you must accept.
- Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.
- Tactical success guarantees nothing.
- Most important decisions are not made by generals.
- What works this week in this province might not work next week in another province.

Executing an effective counterinsurgency strategy necessitates a carefully crafted campaign design that is attuned to the conditions specific to the environment. In general, however, effectively countering an insurgency requires addressing a wide range of challenges (e.g., employing tribal elements, converting residual regime elements, confronting foreign fighters). Each aspect of the insurgency requires a distinctive approach and change over time.

International Perspectives on Counterinsurgency

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT:

- The British campaign in Malaya is often presented as the textbook example of counterinsurgency. Britain's success there was built on the practice of imperial policing and on the concepts and techniques known as "limited war." The campaign in Malaya bore many of the hallmarks of "war" but nonetheless did not culminate in a great Napoleonic battle. In this sense, the Malaya campaign can be a useful entry point for examining how to define and deal with insurgencies today.
- An insurgency is a symptom of political, social, religious, and /or cultural problems. Thus, countering an insurgency requires understanding and addressing its *causes*. In these situations, it is highly unlikely that military force will be the *decisive* line of operations. Counterinsurgency is aimed at ameliorating situations, rather than deterring or coercing in order to attain a predetermined outcome. COIN is essentially concerned with setting conditions for a political settlement.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE ENEMY:

- Al Qaeda is the face of a new enemy. Historically, insurgents had tried to change or modify the state as much as to overthrow it. We could and we did deal with insurgents in Palestine and Malaya. In the case of al Qaeda there is no one to talk with and nothing to talk about, but killing al Qaeda operatives alone is insufficient. The society in which the insurgency is embedded remains the operational-level battleground just as much as did when defeating communist insurgents during the Cold War.
- The advent of cell phones and the Internet have enabled insurgents to disseminate techniques farther and faster. There has been a proliferation of Websites that contain practical information about assembling improvised explosive devices [IEDs], and that supply directions for recruits to travel to and

join *jihad* [religious war]. This “virtual realm” of insurgency is largely ungovernable partly because our own laws prevent us from doing so.

CULTURE AND ASYMMETRY:

- In any conflict where there is a weaker side confronting a more powerful adversary, the result is often what is known as “asymmetric war.” But all warfare is asymmetric in the sense that each side seeks to pit its strengths against the opponent’s weakness. The real asymmetry lies in culture, the complex barcode of history, climate, geography, race, and religion that distinguishes one nation from another. It is essential to understand the culture in order to identify the center of gravity and key vulnerabilities of an insurgency.

COMPLEXITY, EFFECTS AND OUTCOMES:

- Effective counterinsurgency requires a keen appreciation of the distinction between *strategic outcomes* and *operational effects*. For example, in launching military operations, is it prudent to cripple communications infrastructure knowing that the war is to be followed by reconstruction? Military professionals cannot indulge the luxury of hoping that someone else will consider non-kinetic aspects of operations.
- If we accept that failed states and ungoverned territory are the parents of terror and insurgency and that insurgency is often allied with criminality, then our perspective has to be wider than military force.
- Somebody has to lead the cross-governmental and cross-coalitional effort and be given the right resources and authority to do it. The military can ill afford to wait for some other institution to supply a comprehensive approach. It must establish an array of relationships with non-military organizations in the theater of operations.

INTELLIGENCE AND TARGETING:

- Intelligence-led military operations are critically important to achieving political objectives, pursuing reconstruction, assessing critical vulnerabilities and ensuring force protection.
- Incorrect targeting not only creates a public relations disaster, but also undermines confidence and consent of the population. The risks and costs incurred by targeting errors have increased the need for accurate real time data, and have raised the threshold of “certainty” required to launch an operation.

TRAINING AND PREPARATION:

- Military exchange programs and the roles of military attachés should be reoriented toward counterinsurgency.
- Collective training regimes should be adjusted.
- Exposing commanders to uncertainty will help them learn to assess and manage risks while obtaining an intuitive grasp of the situation. The most important resource is not tempo, but time – time to think and build a base of experience.
- Training should remain with the chain of command. Subcontracting has the effect of separating responsibility, authority over resources and accountability for mistakes.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHRIS HICKEY

The Lessons of Tal Afar

The experience of the battalion-size, combined arms task force partnered with an Iraqi brigade in Tal Afar, Iraq, from May 2005 to February 2006 provides potentially valuable insights about the challenges associated with waging an effective counterinsurgency campaign.

THE CHALLENGE:

- Tal Afar is situated amidst desert terrain with logistical support fed into the area from the south.
- The population of Tal Afar is 90 percent Turkmen and 10 percent Arab with a religious composition of approximately 75 percent Sunni and 25 percent Shiite.
- The two key points in the political timetable during the time of this operation were the October 2005 referendum and the December 2005 election. We were charged with ensuring that these events happened safely.
- In discharging this responsibility we had to perform a wide range of tasks simultaneously:
 - help to improve Iraqi security forces,
 - conduct combat operations, and
 - engage in information and civil-military activities.
- Upon our arrival, we encountered a community where electrical power was available just a few hours per day, and where the food distribution, water and political systems were broken. The mere 200-strong Shiite police was afraid to go on patrol, fearful of sectarian attacks. Key officials did not meet or talk to each other. The region averaged five attacks per day when the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment first took control of the area.

THE RESPONSE:

- Conducted reconnaissance in the cognitive sense, learning as much as possible about the tribes.
- Maintained engagement with the population.
- Rebalanced the police force in order better to reflect the city's demographic composition. Recruitment was initially very difficult, but gradually eased.
- Not only arrived in full force and stayed, but partnered with Iraqi forces.
- Reinforced police ranks with Sunni police from Mosul, obtaining instant credibility. After restoring rights, the situation improved. Contractors flowed in. Progress in reconstruction built trust and confidence.
- Set up 29 patrol bases dispersed throughout the city.
- Established a 24-hour communications center, making cell phone numbers widely available.
- Built an earth fortification around the city to funnel traffic into four checkpoints, thereby inhibiting terrorist freedom of movement.
- Spent millions of dollars on projects, including rebuilding 40 schools and the main hospital, repairing roads, and painting/locating Iraqi flags all over the city to help instill confidence in the government.
- Restored local government by fostering regular meetings at a single location between the mayor, police chief, and other key officials; by encouraging outreach to the citizens; and by reviving basic elements of the judicial system (e.g., issuance of marriage licenses).

THE INSIGHTS:

- Securing the population by employing patrol bases paid dividends, as members of the community gradually came to assist in reconnaissance and surveillance.
- The perception that security is improving has cascading effects: safety leads to information that, in turn, contributes to safety.
- Partnering is productive. Iraqi army officers, steeped in the language and culture as well as being nationalist and secular in orientation, were vitally important partners – helping to build bridges with the community and to gather intelligence.
- A central combined arms structure enhances responsiveness.
- Be even-handed in sectarian situation – engage to correct misperceptions contributing to environment of trust.
- Encouraging personal ownership – finding ways to develop stakeholders in security and reconstruction processes – helps to discredit the terrorists.

QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD

Q: *(Mansoor)* Does a democracy have any inherent weaknesses in fighting an insurgency?

A: *(Kalev)* Authoritarian regimes rely primarily on terror and repression. Western societies, founded on law, have to take a different approach. The issue here is time. Western democratic states engaged in counterinsurgency need time to restore government, to build institutions anew.

Q: *(Mansoor)* A decade or more from now, is it possible that the U.S. Army might observe that this period too was an aberration?

A: *(Conrad)* The new manual is intended to be lasting. It is important to retain the ability to fight. But conventional military challenges won't be dominant for a long time. Failed states and the proliferation of non-state actors make it highly likely that counterinsurgency is the future for a very long time.

Q: *(Mansoor)* What is the best troop ratio for an effective counterinsurgency campaign?

A: *(Riley)* In dealing with Basra, Belfast or any other city, the consent of the population is critically important. Concentrating force is appropriate, but only where and when it matters. It is essential to effect a handover to local forces wherever you can as fast as you can. Above all, it is important to blend force, money and expertise in order to sort out the basic needs of the population, thereby to change perceptions and ultimately the environment.

Q: *(Mansoor)* You had two tours in Iraq as commander of the same cavalry squadron, the first time in Fallujah and the second time in Tal Afar. Why were your operations on the second deployment so much more successful than on the first?

A: *(Hickey)* On the second occasion, U.S. forces were joined by 2,000 Iraqi infantry, led by seasoned Iraqi commanders who are secular and nationalist. The timing also mattered. The summer of 2003 was a window of opportunity in Falluja: easy movement, few attacks, lots of money and an ample number of contractors. But money soon ran out and became increasingly difficult to get. Progress in reconstruction lagged. Expectations were dashed. That opportunity was missed.

Q: *COIN focuses on equipping, training, empowering and educating. What, if anything, needs to be added to this menu of tasks?*

A: *(Crane)* Force structure must be addressed. Decentralization is key. While there are some who realize this, there is resistance to it.

A: *(Sepp)* Decentralization is evident in the field. In Iraq, there is a generation of NCOs [noncommissioned officers] and company-grade officers whose independence is being driven by the simple fact of geography and by some savvy military commanders receptive to it.

A: *(Hickey)* Our approach to counterinsurgency must be based on initiative and trust.

Q: *In terms of new acquisition needs for COIN, what are the top three innovations?*

A: *(Mansoor)* Equipment needs for COIN include unmanned air and ground vehicles; an unattended ground sensor network that can control a stretch of road; and a vehicle better suited to counterinsurgency than the heavily armored Humvee.

A: *(Crane)* Move money away from the purchases of F-22s and fix the interagency process.

A: *(Hickey)* Better radios would help give us speed and agility at the point of the spear. Improving command and control at the ground level would also be helpful.

A: *(Sepp)* Sticking with low technologies is important because (a) the host nation won't be able to maintain hi-tech items when we eventually withdraw, and (b) excessive emphasis on technology reinforces the misconception that this is how to defeat an insurgency.

A: *(Riley)* Enhancing the ability to intercept cell phones, Internet and satellite transmissions would be useful. But, in the final analysis, there is no substitute for good human intelligence.

Q: The received wisdom in the mainstream media and on Capitol Hill is that if we describe Iraq as a "civil war" rather than as an "insurgency" somehow the war changes. Is this correct?

A: *(Crane)* The differences between the two are in degree, not type. A civil war, for example, might have a stronger identity component than does an insurgency. But the general processes are the same.

A: *(Riley)* When a country reaches civil war, security structures fragment. The army fractures and its elements take sides. If we ever get to that stage in Iraq (and we are nowhere near that point now), we would be in trouble because ultimately it is the job of Iraqis to take over from us.

- Q:** *We've always found that the idea of negotiating with insurgents is anathema, but we can. They have interests. Is there no value in making contacts and sending messages? If we refuse to negotiate, do we not condemn ourselves to a longer stay?*
- A:** (Riley) Clearly, in the case of Iraq, it is not only possible to talk to some insurgents but arguably essential to do so. However, with respect to al Qaeda, there is no indication that they want to talk to us, or that we should. Engaging in the media is not the same as negotiation. It is also important to keep in mind that in Iraq different struggles are going on in different parts of the country. Sectarian violence often takes place in the same areas insurgency. It is difficult to work out which is which.
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- Q:** *Drawing on the experiences of India in Kashmir and Sri Lanka in the 1980s, where longevity of the tour of duty in the area of the insurgency was two years, isn't the one-year tour for U.S. forces and six months for Canadian troops too short? Second, and also drawing on the Indian experience, where mounted operations were minimal, isn't the tendency of U.S. forces to hunker down counter-productive to winning the hearts and minds of the population?*
- A:** (Crane) It may be useful to think about the distinction between the *individual* tour and the *organizational* tour. In this way, a division itself might remain in place for longer periods while individual rotations remain more or less the same.
- A:** (Hickey) The experience in Tal Afar suggests that moving among the people while minimizing risks is possible. Patrol bases helped. Being on the ground with Iraqi army or police did as well. In areas or situations that were more contentious, armored vehicles formed an outer cordon, while troops on the ground continued engaging with the population.
- A:** (Riley) Historically, British forces have had longer than the current six-month tour. During the Malaya campaign, tours were two years. However, lengthening the tour must be balanced against the risk of wearing down the force.

Q: *How important is the interagency process?*

A: *(Crane)* All countries are facing the same challenges of developing and coordinating comprehensive strategies.

A: *(Sepp)* We are building states from the ground up. Wide-ranging expertise is needed to accomplish this. It is unreasonable and unfair to place the burden of this complex enterprise on the shoulders of the U.S. military or any other military.

Each panelist had a distinctive focus and emphasis. However, several common themes emerged from their presentations and the ensuing discussion.

The first is that, given the phenomena of failed states and the proliferation of nonstate actors, COIN is the future.

The second is that the U.S. military cannot assume that the civilian leadership will supply a pre-packaged comprehensive strategy for countering insurgencies and thus must forge ahead to develop a counterinsurgency doctrine and adjust training, force structure and acquisition accordingly.

The third is that the U.S. Army's new *FM3-24 Counterinsurgency* goes a long way toward laying the doctrinal foundation for mounting effective counterinsurgency operations.

The fourth is that the essence of such operations is that they are multi-level and multifaceted in character – encompassing the security, political and economic spheres; involving all U.S. government institutions (not just the armed forces); and geared toward separating the insurgents from the population.

The fifth is that the military component of counterinsurgency operations must carefully balance lethal and non-lethal activities, devolve authority to the extent possible to the field level, partner with local forces, and maximize engagement with the host nation population.

BIOGRAPHIES

MODERATOR:

Colonel Peter R. Mansoor

USA/USMC Counterinsurgency Center

Colonel Peter Mansoor, United States Army, is the director of the USA/USMC Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Prior to this assignment he spent a year as a senior military fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the United States, Europe and the Middle East during his 24 year career. He commanded the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Iraq and Germany from July 2003 to June 2005, to include 13 months in combat in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Previously he served as G-3 of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas, and commanded the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry from 1999-2002. He has also served on the Joint Staff as the special assistant to the director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5). A distinguished graduate and recipient of a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy in 1982, he holds a master's and doctorate in military history from The Ohio State University and a Master of Strategic Studies degree from the Army War College. COL Mansoor is the author of *The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of U.S. Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945*.

PANELISTS:**Conrad Crane, Ph.D.**

U.S. Army Military History Institute

Topic: *Evolution of Counterinsurgency Doctrine*

Conrad C. Crane became the director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute on Feb. 1, 2003. Before accepting that position, Dr. Crane served with the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the U.S. Army War College from September 2000 to January 2003, where he held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research. He joined SSI after his retirement from active military service, a 26-year military career that concluded with nine years as a professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA). He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from USMA and a master's and doctorate from Stanford University. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Crane has authored or edited books and monographs on the Civil War, World War I, World War II, Korea and Vietnam, and has written and lectured widely on airpower and landpower issues. Before leaving SSI he coauthored a prewar study, "Reconstructing Iraq," that influenced Army planners and has attracted much attention from the media. He is the lead author for Field Manual/Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hickey

War College Fellow, School of Advanced Military Studies

Topic: *The Lessons of Tal Afar*

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hickey is an armor officer who served on two deployments to Iraq as a squadron commander in the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, to include operations in Fallujah and Tal Afar.

Following completion of the Armor Officer Basic Course, LTC Hickey was assigned to the 1st Armored Division in Germany as a tank platoon leader and company executive officer. After graduating from the Armor Officer Advanced Course in 1990, LTC Hickey joined the 24th ID during Operation Desert Shield, where he served as a battalion maintenance officer and tank company commander. His next assignment was as an observer/controller at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, Calif. He then attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. and went on to earn a masters degree at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Pursuant to his graduation from SAMS, LTC Hickey was assigned to the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas, where he served as the G-3 Plans Officer. Following this assignment, he was assigned as the S-3 for 1-10 Cavalry and later the S-3 for 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. In 2001, LTC Hickey left Fort Hood and attended the Joint Services Staff College. He was subsequently assigned to Joint Forces Command as an observer/trainer at the Joint Warfighting Center. In July 2003, LTC Hickey took command of 2nd Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and led the unit through two deployments in Iraq in Al Anbar and Ninevah Provinces. He changed command in June 2006 and is currently a war college fellow at the School of Advanced Military Studies.

LTC Hickey holds a Master of Business Administration from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. He is a graduate of Airborne School and Ranger School, and his awards include the Bronze Star Medal and the Defense Meritorious Service Medal.

Major General Jonathon Riley DSO (late RWF)

British Army

Topic: *International Perspective on Recent Counterinsurgency Operations*

Major General Riley is the Senior British Military Advisor (SBMA) to the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM).

He joined the Army in 1973 and was commissioned the following year. Since then he has served peacetime tours of duty in Britain, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Kenya and Cyprus. He taught at Sandhurst from 1984-1986, attended the Staff College Camberley as a student in 1987, and taught at Camberley in 1993. He has been Chief of Staff of an armoured brigade and an armoured division. On operations, Maj Gen Riley has served six tours in Northern Ireland, one in Central America, five in the Balkans and one in Sierra Leone. He has commanded on operations in every rank, including commanding the Royal Welch Fusiliers in Gorazde during 1995; command of 1 Mechanized Brigade in Bosnia in 1999, Deputy Commanding General of Multi-national Division (South-West) in Bosnia, 1998 – 1999; command of the UK tri-service Joint Task Force in Sierra Leone in 2000-2001; Deputy Commanding General, Coalition Military Advisory and Training Team, Iraq, 2003 – 2004; and command of Multi-national Division (South-East) in Iraq, 2004 - 2005. He was the Deputy Commandant of the Staff College, responsible for the Higher Command and Staff Course – the senior course in the college – as well as all courses for Army students, from 2001 - 2003 He was awarded the Distinguished Service Order in 1996 and made an Officer of the Legion of Merit of the United States of America in 2004.

Major General Riley holds a bachelor's degree in Geography from University College London and a master's in History from the University of Leeds. He is currently working for a doctorate. He has a number of published works of which the best known are *From Pole to Pole* (1987), *Soldiers of the Queen* (1993), *White Dragon* (1995), *The Royal Welch Fusiliers, 1945 – 2000* (2001), and *Napoleon and the World War - 1813* (2000). In addition he contributes to several magazines and journals. His interests are historical research, rowing and white water rafting, literature and languages, field sports and environmental issues.

Professor Kalev I. Sepp

Naval Postgraduate School

Topic: *Best (and Worst) Practices in Counterinsurgency*

Kalev I. Sepp is an assistant professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., teaching in the Special Operations Program. He received his doctorate in American Diplomatic History from Harvard University, and earned his Combat Infantryman's Badge as a brigade adviser in the Salvadoran Civil War and as a Special Forces A-Team leader in Panama. He visited Afghanistan to cowrite an official study of U.S. Army special operations there, and served in Iraq on several occasions as a consultant on intelligence, counterinsurgency and strategy. He has testified before the United States Congress on the training of Iraqi military units, and currently is an expert member of the Baker-Hamilton Bipartisan Commission on Iraq. He also holds a master's degree in Military Art and Science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

